key building blocks in Supreme
precedent for an anti-sorting principle-a
principle that would disfavor the alignment of
political with religious boundaries. The first is a case about
exclusion. Upon learning that a Santeria church was planned
for construction within the City of Hialeah, a series of
ordinances was adopted. Part of the Santeria faith calls for
animal sacrifice, and the practical effect of the ordinances
was to outlaw "ritual" animal sacrifice without
threatening
kosher butchers. The Court unanimously held the ordinances
invalid. Going out of its way to teach the locals a lesson,
the majority explained that Santeria is a religion for First
Amendment purposes even though the City did not argue
otherwise. The opinion opened with the observation that
local officials "did not understand, failed to perceive, or
chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated
the Nation's essential commitment to religious freedom."
are two

There

Court

Commentators discuss the Santeria

free exercise, and it is

surely

that.

case as a matter

Presumably

result would obtain if the State of Florida
Government
But in the

adopted

the

same

spirit of economist

or

the

of

same

the Federal

rules for animal sacrifice.

in the latter but
at overt

not

the former. The Court would blanch

government efforts to restrict migration of
to select communities even if 99% of

residential property within the region remained open. A
different result seems unlikely for denominations like Santeria.
Even

so,

In the

the Hialeah decision is

might

spirit

entirely anti-sorting.
pro-sorting but anti-subordination.
Supreme Court's Carotene Products

be read

of the

not

as

decision rather than Tiebout, the Court

protecting

the interests

might have been
of non-mainstream religions to

SPRING

that the local

A year after the Hialeah decision, the New York
legislature was rebuked for drawing a new public school
case.

the request of the Satmar Hasidim. The district's
boundaries would have matched the Satmars' residential

district

at

Village of Kiryas Joel, and the Court balked
consciously aligning political institutions with
religious geography. This was true even though both the
Satmars and the adjacent community were probably
grateful for the partition. The former wanted the new
district to provide special education services apart from
enclave in the
at

officials

non-Satmar students, who

2006.

were a source

of discomfort

and humiliation for their children.
The ramifications of the

African-Americans

In fact it

means

Charles Tiebout-who

benefits of political

pointed
jurisdictions responding
to and
competing for mobile citizen voters-the Court
might have told the newcomers to sort themselves into a
more-accepting municipality. Or, recognizing that the City
of Hialeah could not have guaranteed Santeria space in any
other jurisdiction, the Court might have distinguished a
hypothetical statewide program that achieved such a guarantee.
But nothing in the Court's decision is so pro-sorting. It
does not suggest that a municipality may expel a disfavored
religion from its territory as long as another municipality
stays open. To the contrary, the opinion-protecting "the
Nation's essential commitment" to religious liberty-indicates
opposition to sect-targeted and government-backed efforts
to achieve local
homogeneity. For federal constitutional
purposes, then, religion looks more like race than wealth:
localities may more-or-less explicitly zone for homogeneity
out

themselves however

they wish. Perhaps Santeria's
victory
political unpopularity of a
like
her
is not something she
race,
migrant's religion,
should have to worry about while sorting. But even with a
useful concept of "minority religion" within a multitude of
faiths, this reading is not quite right. The Court's concern
goes beyond empowering minorities to join a locality that
prefers to maintain its religious composition.
The point is made by a second and more controversial
sort

decision did

not

for

even

case are

unclear, however. The

entail invalidation of the Satmars'

village,
though it was religiously homogenous
by any standard. Why not? Dicta indicates that the
Court's worry was that state officials purposefully singled
out the Satmars for special treatment in
creating the school
district but not the village. "State action" was needed to
get either one, of course. But the State might have been
too conscious of sectarian beneficiaries in
dealing with the
school district, and failed adequately to assure empathy for
similarly situated communities. By contrast, the village's
boundaries were generated by a process facially neutral
example,
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with respect to religion. Any group could seek municipal
status by that process. If we assume the Satmar
village is

or at

constitutionally permissible, perhaps the state may facilitate
sorting by all groups, as long as it does not purposefully
facilitate religious sorting. On the other hand, an anti
subordination principle might re-enter the picture here; it
could restrict the benefits of municipal status for religiously
monolithic communities to systematic losers in the political
process. After all, the Satmars traveled a long way before
reaching Kiryas Joel, ultimately seeking village status to
escape restrictive zoning ordinances burdening

least

was an

to

the Court's

opposition

should be

to

is

a

race cases.

A

districts

to

match racial

majority

norm

demographics.

special school district
religion
presumptively valid
basis on which to draw legislative districts. The
majority did not disagree on the religion point,
and nobody contended that such districting
needed to relieve religious subordination. Why
the free pass on legislative districts?
A simple explanation turns on the different
functions served by jurisdictional boundaries. In
legislative districting, officials mold the membership of a
decision-making body drawn from a given citizenry. Those
representatives later assemble and make policy. District
lines no doubt affect the legislature's composition, but
homogeneity within districts will not necessarily have a
serious impact on influence within the assembly. In drawing
state and
municipal boundaries, however, the citizenry
itself is defined. This is important as long as state and local
governments retain significant decision-making authority
of their own. And homogeneity within such polities is
undeniably connected to influence over what is taught in
public schools, who enjoys exemptions from regulation,
which books show up in public libraries, who runs the
local courts, and so on. Religious anti-sorting principles
are aimed at the manufacture of such
polities.
SORTING

is

8
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special
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no

law

on

meant

ability of the federal
state
religious
constitutional anti-sorting

to

interfere with

depends

on movement

a

when ratified, it

the

since 1791. The

importance

of the Fourteenth Amendment and

subsequent

constitutional

theory is

examined

and the dramatic

history

is

legal change thereafter. This
sufficiently intriguing that countless

scholars have traced and retraced it. But

developments
perspective

that

are not

are

crucial from

highlighted in

a

major
sorting

contemporary

legal scholarship.
The fact is that

state

our

country

ran an

extended

experiment with religious sorting policies at the
experiments were intimately

and local level. These

associated with official

religious "establishments," and they
history is commonly seen as a regrettable
episode of intolerant deprivations of religious liberty and
equality-a misstep to be forgiven in light of a population
so much less diverse than
today's. But that homogeneity
was
the
result
of
partly
purposeful official efforts to sculpt
religious demographics in the New World. Religious
establishments were part of a dynamic migration system.
Less-welcoming atmospheres tend to ward off the less-welcome,
while attracting the favored class. A religious-sorting
perspective on American history emphasizes these dynamics.
The British colonies provided havens for Protestants, who
did

•

not

survive. This

had strong incentives to sort themselves out of Europe, and
for those who thought the Church of England was corrupt.
The colonies

Details aside, the Satmar and Santeria decisions indicate
that

agnostic about religious
explicit promise that Congress

below. However, the argument should begin with
government policy predating the Constitution

a

EXPERIMENTS AND LEGAL CHANGE

And the

government
"establishments." So

invalidate the Satmars'

indicated that

resolve. As such, the Federal

to

indicated restraints

Yet dissenters in those cases-all of whom voted
to

a

was at most

Whatever else the clause

religious

of the Court has been concerned when officials draw

legislative

can we

Is there

"respecting" an establishment
of religion made the document arguably pro-sorting.

here. The attention

fair inference from

issue for them

sorting.

on

This is

for, the precedent?

would make

emphasized
religious cleavages that match political
boundaries but not all boundaries will be policed.
sorting

account

Constitution of 1791

their way of life. The character and dimension of
any principles underlying the case are undefined.
One limit

sometimes invalid. But

justify,
legitimate
constitutional foundation for anti-sorting principles?
Arguments from plain text or original meaning at the
founding are unlikely suspects. The First Amendment's
religion clauses were drafted as restraints on "Congress"
and, by logical extension, the rest of the federal government.
The posture of state and local governments toward religion
homogeneity are

same

were

sometimes advertised

as

such. At the

time, these outposts executed the most severe forms of
against other faiths. Certainly part of the story is

intolerance

SPRING
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religious liberty simpliciter. Regulation of religious
practices, such as rules limiting who could preach or
perform legally recognized marriage ceremonies, were
obviously impositions on minorities within a given colony.
But such regulation and promotion also were mechanisms
that encouraged sorting during periods of mass migration.
For a time, some colonies even adopted immigration laws to
exclude or deport those of the wrong religion. A Virginia
policy excluded Catholics and Puritans; Massachusetts Bay
Colony banished Quakers and others. In the latter case,
Quakers faced the death penalty for returning to
Massachusetts, not simply for their heresy. The
Colony preferred conformity, to be sure, but the
primary tool seems to have been population
about

Adherents

were

Not all

so

either conform

aimed

be

to

remain

go elsewhere.
sectarian enclaves.

or

narrowly
Congregational influence in New
England and the Anglican establishments of some Southern
states
by settling in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or
Rhode Island. They billed themselves as relatively open
political societies. The variance in church-state policies
offered choices of politico-religious culture. Many people
must have made decisions accordingly. Forced to characterize
the early American law of religion as anti-liberty
or
pro-sorting, one could easily favor the latter.
states

to

One could avoid the

Either way, the formal establishments soon
collapsed. Any Anglican establishment was poorly

abandoned before

from the Crown, but efforts

minority religions might well prefer

anonymous, and

control rather than conversion.
These formal exclusions

to

outlive the Revolution. Other schemes

situated

to

failed

well. For instance, South Carolina's

as

pro-establishment

clauses

repealed in 1790.
of locally established faiths,

shape
the religious population continued. Several early
state governments officially preferred sets of
religious beliefs and practices. For example, South

Massachusetts' system
which outlasted all the other formal establishments,

Carolina's 1778 Constitution declared Protestantism

additional

religion. To achieve
incorporated
religious societies would have
to
that
Christianity is the "true religion,"
agree
the New Testament is "of divine inspiration," and
there is a "future state of rewards and punishments."
Such provisions were liberal compared to colonial
policy, but they still made statements about the
religious commitment expected of inhabitants.

competing

economic

religiously

closed

separation

to

was

the State's established
status,

More

important,

some

colonies and

states

many residents and the

can

then directed

on

all

states

softened. Inter-faith

eliminated, of course. If nothing
in the nineteenth

century defeats that claim. And religiously restrictive
used to shape local demographics

long after the original

establishments

were

discontinued. Yet the idea of state-orchestrated

partition of religious groups seems to have lost
legitimacy in relatively short order.
In fact, a sign of the change can be found in a passage
of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessey v. Ferguson. It put
state-mandated religious segregation on a list of shocking
hypotheticals that the supporters of racial segregation
were

challenged to distinguish:
[I] f this

SPRING
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of Louisiana is consistent with

personal liberty of citizens, why may not the
state require the separation in railroad coaches
of native and naturalized citizens of the United

States,

identifiable

statute

the

or

proceeds
religious organization or figure. In other words, officially
preferred beneficiaries were probably easier to identify than
disfavored religionists. In addition, financing schemes that
allowed people to opt out, or to direct their tax contribution
to
minority religions, can also facilitate sorting. To choose
one of these
options is to identify oneself as a dissident.
to an

by immigration,
diversity, and
interests, the impulse for

of religious

.covenants were

taxed

be levied

sources

animosity
else, the experience of Catholics

..

tax, in contrast,

abolished in 1833. Buffeted

was not

people for the specific purpose of funding preferred
churches or ministers. Virginia famously ran such a system
for a time. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire
authorized municipalities to select a minister for tax-and
transfer, thereby further decentralizing without rejecting
religious establishments. From a sorting perspective, these
programs might be superior to immigration laws. The latter
must have been difficult to enforce insofar as
religious
commitments can be sustained without social visibility-a
fact that helps explain severe penalties for return after
banishment. A

were

This

or

of Protestants and Roman Catholics?

might support only a narrow anti-sorting
rule, involving legally coerced segregation by religion. But
it's

statement

a start.

ANTI-SORTING

IN THEORY

Entrenching every perceived resolution of political conflict
is no way to do constitutional law, of course. Anti-sorting
principles need arguments to distinguish them from other
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trends. As

a matter

from outsiders who

of constitutional text, the critical

state-restraining provisions of the Fourteenth
text is so underspecified, and
because its inspiration was chattel slavery, a religion-oriented
anti-sorting norm must be reinforced with a broader or
different constitutional theory. This is not the place for a
fully articulated sorting theory or an end to the "incorporation"
sources are

the

debate. Normative and
caution

with

a

against

a

And this
There

out concrete

killer.

ideas

synergistic. The concept of "law
establishment of religion" would be borrowed

sometimes

action

The second

by

route

one or more

does

not

a

prohibition

beyond

the

particularities

terms.

First Amendment

of establishment

two

consequences, and empirical data.
THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The first

state

was

district would have

THE

served. It is

not even

clear that the

new

required substantial additional tax dollars
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ratified. In fact,

even

a

few

state

and territorial

mimicked the federal establishment

respecting" language. Thomas Cooley's
state

constitutions in

extremely unlikely that

just

those

these clauses reflected

connection,

moreover, was

anti-Catholicism that

of international

immigration. But
incompatible with
notions
of
the
proper relationship between
prevailing
and
religion. And we now know that sorting
government
accompanied state and colonial programs regarding religion,
we
might conclude that government-propelled religious
messages are a component of any "establishment" worthy
of the name, and we are in any case much closer to placing
an
anti-sorting norm within the Fourteenth Amendment.
Once the values of deregulated religious liberty and
non-establishment are imported, anti-sorting is not only a
matter of historical
analogy. The principle may be prophylactic,
and here there is a connection with anti-proselytism.
Monitoring the conduct of officials within local religious
enclaves can be difficult. Without effective monitoring,
however, these enclaves can disrupt political choices at the
state and national levels. Furthermore, sorting will often
be imperfect. This was true even under colonial regimes.
Religious faith can be relatively invisible if an individual so
chooses, while non-religious reasons plainly affect location
decisions. Thus a municipality dominated by one sect
might still have non-conformists to deal with. Leaving the

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The latter

of the Satmars

there is material

new waves

sub-national "establishments" became

of both

certain

It is

accompanied

understandings
explicitly
restrains state action in multiple ways that might be relevant:
protecting privileges or immunities, guaranteeing liberty
with due process, demanding equal protection of the laws;
even the
grants of national and state citizenship can be relied
on. A free-exercise norm, moreover, fits
easily within these
concepts. There is even Fourteenth Amendment drafting
history to that effect. Excluding people or organizations
from states or municipalities, such as Hialeah's attempt to
prevent Santeria's immigration, is thus relatively easy to
prohibit under the Fourteenth Amendment. The result in
the Santeria case shielded a sect from a ritual-targeting
government prohibition. But for discretionary beneiits like
a school district for the Satmars, the constitutional
problem
is harder to see (at least if equal protection norms are
satisfied). In some ways the new district promoted religious
liberty-perhaps not a system of liberty in which multiple
sects thrive and interact, but surely the
religious autonomy
path depends

on

to

cross-jurisdictional protection for other states. A better
explanation lies in the shift away from formal establishments
among the original states, along with changing political
values in the West. Government was by no means disconnected
from religion in the 1800s; part of the allergy to "church"

lines of the argument can
interpretation.
then be joined with modern political theory, concern for
These

clause

option

yet another structural decision to decentralize religious
questions to municipalities, and they were certainly not

concepts. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment itself
underwrites an anti-sorting norm. Either way, the argument
is above and

between 1791

liberty at the founding, these
coupled by the time the Fourteenth

1868 treatise summarized

clauses in the Fourteenth.

directly rely on

was

clause and its "law

is conventional yet

from the First Amendment and converted into

10

were

constitutions

on state

changed

from the notion of religious

principle.

Amendment

respecting

that

support
this thesis. However disconnected disestablishment was

of the

an

states

this track is that the American

Perhaps
Even ignoring stare decisis,

Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction. The first
route

on

it moved from local

and 1868.

constitutional

promising
anti-sorting principle. Both rely on implications
routes to a

appropriated by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The best argument

structure

versions of the

a

view of religious establishments

of the argument.
will further the equally challenging task

are two

articulate

federalism-promoting concession to the
resists an easy transplant into the Fourteenth.

empirical
strongly
anti-sorting principle, anyway. Yet
the

to

be

was a

uncertainties

we can see

structure

of grinding

plausibly

can

After all, the establishment clause of the First Amendment

robust

little effort,

be done

must

Amendment. But because that

suggests that more
non-establishment norm that

might object. This

•
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imperfectly sorted religious enclaves can
policy. Nor is the threat restricted
to sectarian
proselytizing and ostracism. There is likewise
reason to
worry that imperfectly sorted secular enclaves
will disregard constitutional guarantees of religious liberty.
And the more generous one is with free exercise rights, the
law

to

such

therefore threaten social

more

worried

REPUBLIC

should be about secular dominance

one

political community. As such the sectarian vision
of Republic, Missouri in the 1990s was not categorically

within

a

different from the atheistic

aspiration of Liberal,

the 1880s-a Town

than

Missouri in

declare its official

happy
opinion that "MAN'S SAVIOR MUST BE MAN ALONE."
Fears persist, moreover, even when sorting is complete.
A nightmare scenario is suggested by charges against the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints in Colorado City, Arizona. Members allegedly
more

to

sorted themselves into relative isolation, minimized

access

technology, taught theories of racial
superiority,
girls to patriarchal domination,
banished hundreds of teenage boys to maintain a gender
imbalance for polygyny, used government officials to
further Church diktats concerning romantic relationships,
and diverted tax dollars intended for public schools to
to

communications

subordinated

Church
this

operations.

context.

In

If critics

fact, "diversion" loses meaning in

are correct

about Colorado

City,

local government authority is now an arm of the Church
and wielded to achieve religious goals. This fits any plausible
definition of religious establishment.
and

state

might

be

a

poor

slogan

Separation

of church

for the establishment clause,

With The Ozarks

Growing

running a contest for a city flag and seal, the local
government for the City of Republic in southwestern Missouri

After

elliptical shape with symbols in four quadrants. On
were images of a traditional nuclear family and
a fish, or ichthys, commonly associated with Christianity
The seal was displayed on city buildings, city vehicles, city
stationery, and city-limit signs. A local minister declared that
the ACLU had correctly associated the ichthys with Jesus
Christ, adding, "I say the line is drawn. Stay out of Republic.
We're going to stand for Christian principles.
chose

an

the bottom half

"

connection between

race

of equal

He did

some

citizenship.

and

religion through

so

the concept

in service of nationalism

bare minimum of national

identity and civic unity in

multicultural country, which stands against exclusionary
or
polarizing use of race and religion in politics. Race might
a

be

more

salient in America, but

religion

is another tool

is that

politicians and officials can divide the country.
Engineering a desired composition of religion within a
political boundary is a literal example of this feared partition.

violations

And

with

the best

but church-state

Anyway,

the

integration is certainly not the vision.
important argument for anti-sorting principles

religious homogeneity makes such constitutional
more
likely. And in an interconnected society
a substantial welfare state,
"complete exit" of religious

groups is

more

difficult

Religious sorting

to

achieve.

therefore should be

most

distressing to

those who support robust versions of anti-establishment
norms. However
appealing one might think it to rope
off "the

government" from religious symbols, religious
justifications for public policy, and subsidies benefiting
religious institutions, those goals will be harder to obtain
if the community is monolithically dedicated to one version
of religious faith. All the more so at the local level where
the public/private line, often by design, is faintest.
The argument for a principle disfavoring religious sorting
is bolstered by an alternative path. Post-Reconstruction
ideals of citizenship and nationalism may support it.
Kenneth Karst is a leader here. He forged a theoretical
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with which

one can

reach these conclusions without

specifying

interpretation of the First Amendment.
Yet insofar as racial sorting implicates fears of perpetual
subordination, religious sorting is distinct. Perhaps few
believe that race is a normatively defensible category for

equal, instead of a social fact
for organizing disadvantaged groups. But religion

many purposes and all else
a

tool

or

is

another story. It is far more difficult to demonstrate that
society would be better off with the extermination of
category. Furthermore, free-exercise values
suggest that the Constitution prefers liberated religiosity.
The Reconstruction Amendments, in contrast, are tough

religion

to

read

as a

as

promoting

racial

identity for

its

own

sake

or

for instrumental purposes. Anti-sorting would get more
mileage out of a theory treating religion as constitutionally
even

valued and

THE

religious

divisions
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The conventional

legal logic begins to stretch thin, but
perhaps
nationalizing influence of the Civil War's
resolution supports a neo- Madisonian theory of religious
faction. Madison's now-hackneyed insight was that the
collection of interests into a single political institution
could facilitate reasoned compromise or at least prevent
factional domination. He applied the theory to religious

and officials

the

sects

in The Federalist. But he did

affairs. While Madison

promoted

not

touch

state

theory for decentralized democracy is seriously
by religious homogeneity. This is clearer for
participatory democrats. Many of them want citizens to
confront and understand differences,
boundaries

not

eliminate them

social pressure to conform.
democrats also have something to fear from

by political
Representative
religious sorting, even if preference homogeneity has
upsides. One problem is group polarization. Given certain
conditions, a group of individuals predisposed toward one
position will end up supporting more extreme
policies after deliberation than would have been
predicted by their pre-deliberation preferences.

and local

federal constitutional

anti-sorting principle, because it
sees
religion as politically powerful rather than
habitually subordinated. It recommends integrating
multiple denominations within political institutions.
And it limits the principle to groups dominating
political jurisdictions, not simple geographic
clumping. Christopher Eisgruber pushes similar
arguments, singling out organized religion from
other interests. Although critical to healthy societal
diversity, he contends, religious groups are often
cohesive, impervious to ordinary rational argument,
and uncompromising because organized on
matters of principle. These characteristics might
be accentuated when reinforced with a matching
political boundary. Those lines can bolster group
loyalty, and the use of government machinery may
help solve any remaining collective action problems.
Such theories might leave little for a local
government to decide, though. Before we take
constitutional law to nationalize the primary school
an

In

addition,

or

too

few dissenters

disagreement being
imbalances

can

evaluations

are

voiced

at

can

lead

to no

all. And similar

generate cascades, as subsequent
skewed by prior political victories.

Sometimes these

curriculum, it is worth recalling the virtues of decentralized

syndromes might happily
produce exciting social experiments. On other
occasions the results might be disastrous, without
a
guarantee that the effects will be wholly localized
or that
participants will learn much from mistakes.
Representative democracy might dampen the risks
but this seems less likely at the local level. As
political boundaries encompass smaller populations,
representatives and constituents begin to mirror a
single social group. In this sense, secular enclaves
are no different from their
religious counterparts.
Lastly, social trends might make an anti-sorting
norm attractive to
many integrationists and
nationalists. The country includes undeniably deep cultural
divisions and religion plays a part. Few can believe that the

democracy. Aside from the hoped-for benefits ofTiebout
sorting, some democrats prefer a measure of decentralized

United States will fit strong versions of the secularization
thesis anytime soon, while empirical work suggests:

government power because it creates locations for citizen
participation. The wish is that people develop public

co-religionists are clumped regionally and sometimes
locally-at the county level, perhaps to a degree now

regarding arguments

and interests, rather than

Other democrats

goods.
the goal of molding citizen

are not

interested in

interests

through

•

similar

segregation scores for African Americans;
foreign immigration trends may be contributing to religious
separation, as newcomers sometimes bring shared religious

simply

presenting individual preferences for aggregation. In addition,
interaction might produce cross-cultural knowledge and
cooperation skills, which could themselves qualify as public

to

wholly centralized power.

Local officials

commitments

...

oppose
local politics,

might be better informed about official conduct.
public policy can be more efficiently implemented
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communities;

are

Strumpf suggest that, between 1890 and 1990, the nation
equally segregated at the county level with respect
to
religions, African Americans, and the foreign born-with

residents

THE

geographically distinct

calculations of Professors Paul W Rhode and Koleman S.

be better

informed about local values and conditions, and local
If so,

to

fundamentalist denominations

gaining proportionally to
other sects; yet the percentage of the population unaffiliated
with any religious institution is substantial, if not growing.
Religious segregation scores are worth pausing over. The
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yet encourage decentralization for other reasons. Even
representative forms of local government can be superior
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be better monitored.
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guarantees of religious liberty against the states, he could
not achieve it in the Bill of
Rights. Yet the point
is useful for
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is compatible with support for religious
argument within democratic institutions. Yet it does imply
qualms about organized religious factions, which ought to

falling slightly, the second falling substantially,
recently increasing. A single nationwide
number for "religion" is not obviously comparable with
that for other social categories. The spatial distribution of
many small sects must be aggregated to get a single
segregation score, a handful of larger sects predominate in
the first

anti-sorting

score

and the third

respective regions
commitments

are

by institutional choice and design.
A preference for mixing cannot achieve universal support,
of course. Religious separatists dedicated to avoiding
communities of sin, secularists convinced that religion is
be accounted for

of the country, and our normative
likely distinct in the religion context.

an

But segregation indices are not the only relevant data
point. With year 2000 county-level numbers, we can see

that
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single
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a more

tolerance

"diverse"

as a

liberal

local level. Cook

might

be divided

County, Illinois,
includes

over

to

at

take

untroubling or even
anti-diversity; indeed
thrilling. Anti-sorting
it could be quite the opposite. The principle is
not

concerned with how social divisions
institutionalized. When

are

social

multiple
cleavages
piled upon each other, and then reinforced by
coinciding political boundaries, there is cause to
fear an overly fractionated country operating more
are

confederation of monolithic associations than

people sharing

a

But

inconceivable for

a

unmitigated
functioning
a

of relative inclusion.

same

time,

know all that

we

jurisdiction. A defensible measure of "religious
diversity," moreover, is not readily available. Nor
will the work done on race smoothly carryover
into the religion context, where the historical,
sociological, and normative differences fall
somewhere between significant and massive.
Tempered measures are in order, especially with
respect to constitutional law enforced by courts.
For now the judicial focus ought to be on religious
homogeneity within political jurisdictions,
official action that consciously and effectively promotes or
entrenches such sorting, and the sorting risks that
accompany other doctrinal choices. Doing this much
would be relatively unambitious yet meaningful. Whatever
are the
appropriate doctrinal implications, an anti-sorting
perspective focuses on questions that matter. It pinpoints
live social phenomena in a modern, dynamic, and
religiously diverse nation. This should be a welcome
addition to our continuing search for the proper relationship
between religion and political institutions.
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democracy.

be satisfied.

neutral than, say,

distribution of every identifiable denomination
and secular philosophy across every political

100 cities,

about each of these divisions.
Some of these trends

not

more

humility is in order. We do
reasonably might about the
of
system
religious sorting in America. In addition,
strong anti-sorting rules are understandably
controversial. Nobody should want an even
not

fairly
example,
villages, and towns, not to mention dozens more
special purpose districts for education, parks,
libraries, and so on. Strong anti-sorters might care
extreme

a

liberal

seems

goal
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A county that is

concerns.

whole

to

be any

cannot

nation, and anti-sorting is consistent with

are

significantly across counties, the
understate geographic unevenness

numbers may
in terms of anti-sorting

relatively

basic commitments

family
large number of counties.

the percentage of residents who

claimed varies

Anti-sorting principles

exceeds 50%

denominational

of claimed adherents in

infectious fraud, and still others will

as a

nation of

any fundamental commitment.

it should be clear that anti-sorting principles
anti-religion in a strong sense. Dispersing fellow
believers is not the objective; the worry is alignment of
religious and political borders. A denomination's
geographic concentration is not problematic under the
theory unless, for example, it falls within and dominates a
single political jurisdiction. Furthermore, religious clumping
within a political jurisdiction is not facially problematic if
the jurisdiction as a whole is religiously diverse. The
theory is concerned with monolithic local democracies,
not
neighborhoods lacking governmental authority.
Second, the principle does not entail opposition to religion
in politics. One can
object to the coincidence of government
institutions and uniform beliefs about religion without
fearing the effects of religiosity on politics. In fact,
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